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McGowan: A Delayed Search of an Automobile

A DELAYED SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE MAKES FOR AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEIZURE
CRIMINAL COURT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK CITY
People v. Tashbaeva1
(decided January 31, 2012)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The judiciary’s interpretation of the protections afforded by
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution has given
rise to a complex and controversial area of law. From its express
language, it would seem that the reasonableness of a search and seizure turns on whether it was executed pursuant to a warrant and supported by probable cause, as these two inquiries are used to justify an
invasion into one’s privacy, or alternatively, interference with one’s
security.2 Nevertheless, as an extensive analysis of case law demonstrates that circumstances exist in which a warrantless search and seizure might be found reasonable, and thus, these circumstances have
laid the foundation for judicially-crafted exceptions to the warrant requirement.3
The central issue before the court in People v. Tashbaeva was
one of first impression.4 Without clear precedent on the facts of the
instant case, the plain view doctrine, the search incident to a lawful
arrest exception, the concept of a preliminary investigation, and the
ongoing crime scene rule guided the Criminal Court of New York in
its adjudication.5 After explaining the relevance and analyzing the
rationale underlying each of these distinct concepts, the court ruled

1
2
3
4
5

938 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Crim. Ct. 2012).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
W. MARK WARD, TENN. CRIM. TRIAL PRACTICE § 4:20 (2012-2013 ed.).
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
Id.
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on the issues before it.6 The court held that “once the police have relinquished dominion and control over an automobile they are required to obtain a warrant in order to retrieve evidence therefrom,
even though the evidence may have been initially seized lawfully under the plain view or other recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.”7 The court explained that although a police officer need
not complete a search at the time an initial plain view observation is
made, a seizure that is procured by a “delayed search” is unauthorized, unconstitutional, and therefore, will not stand in court.8 The
court reasoned that the mere fact a seizure would have been legal
when the incriminating item was first observed is not sufficient to
justify a seizure that is unduly delayed, occurring after the preliminary investigation has been completed.9 Before arriving at this conclusion, the court thoroughly considered the applicable legal theories
and cases involving similar facts, specifically, cases in which the
warrantless search was lawfully conducted at the outset, but a delay
in finishing the search of the crime scene gave rise to constitutional
implications.10
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 12, 2011, three officers in an unmarked police vehicle accompanied Officer Tabora down Richmond Avenue.11 Around
10:00 p.m., they observed a car recklessly swerving in and out of
lanes.12 After several efforts to pull the vehicle over, the officers finally succeeded in doing so.13 Upon approaching the defendant’s vehicle, Officer Tabora observed Iryna Tashbaeva’s “physical manifestations of intoxication,” suggesting that she had consumed alcohol
and was under the influence.14 Prior to ordering the defendant to step
out of the car, Officer Tabora made a plain view observation. 15 Of6

Id.
Id. at 876.
8
Id.
9
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 879-81.
10
Id. at 879.
11
Id. at 876.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77 (noting that Iryna Tashbaeva, the defendant, was
the driver of the car).
15
Id. at 877.
7
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ficer Tabora noticed a “partially filled bottle of cognac” and a
“Sprite” bottle on the center console of the car.16 After complying
with Officer Tabora’s orders to step out of the vehicle, the defendant
was arrested and brought to an Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit
(“IDTU”).17 At the time of the arrest, Officer Tabora failed to “seize
or voucher” the bottles observed in the defendant’s vehicle.18 Another problem was that before the defendant was transported to IDTU,
the officers failed to arrange for the “defendant’s vehicle [to be] taken into police custody,” and consequently, the vehicle remained unsecured on the side of the road where the arrest was made.19 The next
morning, Officer Tabora met with the Assistant District Attorney,
and thereafter, proceeded to the defendant’s vehicle to collect the bottles.20 Upon arriving at the scene of the arrest (where the car was
left), the officer sniffed the Sprite bottle, determined it contained alcohol, and removed the Sprite bottle and the bottle of cognac from
the vehicle with intent to use each item as evidence against the defendant.21 Notably, the vehicle was at the site approximately eight to
ten hours before the officer returned to seize the bottles.22
III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

The court engaged in a step-by-step analysis, ultimately concluding that Officer Tabora’s seizure of the two bottles was unauthorized and illegal.23 Beginning with a discussion of the Fourth
Amendment and the protections that it guarantees, the court observed
that “warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.”24 Thus, the court
explained that the search must fall within one of the established exceptions in which the circumstances justify the search, and perhaps,
also justify the subsequent seizure in order for the court to construe
the conduct of law enforcement as reasonable.25 As the court recog16

Id.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 877-78.
22
Id. at 877.
23
Id. at 882.
24
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
25
Id.; see WARD, supra note 3 (explaining all of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement, including the plain view doctrine, the search incident to a lawful arrest
17
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nized, the plain view doctrine is one exception to the Warrant Clause
of the Fourth Amendment, which authorizes the police to proceed
without a warrant in circumstances where illegal contraband is observed in open view.26 The court noted however, that three requirements must be met in order to invoke the plain view doctrine: “(1) the
police [must be] lawfully in a position from which they [can] view an
object; (2) the incriminating character of the object [must be] immediately apparent, and (3) the officers [must] have a lawful right of access to the object.”27
In turn, the court first analyzed whether the immediate stop of
the defendant was lawful.28 Due to the reckless manner in which the
defendant was driving her car, the court found sufficient facts on the
record to show the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving illegally.29 Thus, concluding the stop was justified
under the circumstances, the court next had to decide whether the seizure was lawful.30 Given “the officer’s warrantless retrieval of the
incriminating items from the defendant’s vehicle,” the court turned to
the plain view doctrine to determine whether it was applicable so as
to prevent suppression of the evidence.31 Although only reasonable
suspicion is required to stop a vehicle, probable cause that the evidence is linked to criminal activity is necessary to preserve seized evidence under the plain view doctrine.32
At the outset, the court noted that if both bottles were seized
at the time of or within close proximity to the time of arrest, the seizure would have undoubtedly been lawful under the plain view doctrine.33 That is, if the officer retrieved the two bottles from the vehicle within close proximity to the arrest, as opposed to allowing for an
eight to ten hour delay, the seizure would have been lawful under
well-settled United States Supreme Court precedent.34 The precedent
exception, a valid consent based search, and so on).
26
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
27
Id. (citations omitted).
28
Id. at 877.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 876, 877.
32
Id. at 877.
33
Id. at 879.
34
See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (noting that each of these cases continued to build
upon, clarify, and reaffirm the circumstances under which the search incident to arrest exception is applicable so as to justify a warrantless search and fruits seized therefrom).
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to which the court referenced was initially set forth in Chimel v. California.35 In Chimel, the Supreme Court held “that a search incident
to arrest is valid when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment . . . .”36 The Court in Chimel
limited the scope of the area that was searchable to only that which is
within reaching distance of the passenger.37 In doing so, the Court
relied in part on how reasonableness in the context of the Fourth
Amendment has been interpreted, considering “the history and experience which it embodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the
evils to which it was a response.”38 Thus, the Court explained that
the search incident to arrest exception is limited in its scope, concluding that “[t]he search here went far beyond the petitioner’s person
and the area from within which he might have obtained either a
weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against
him[,]” and therefore, “[t]here was no constitutional justification” to
authorize the warrantless search.39
At first glance, “[t]his rule [appeared to] ‘. . . be stated clearly
enough,’ but in the early going after Chimel it proved difficult to apply, particularly in cases that involved searches ‘inside [of] automobile[s] after the arrestees [we]re no longer in [them].’ ”40 For this
reason, the court in Tashbaeva also looked to New York v. Belton41 to
determine whether the search and seizure at issue in the instant case,
occurring in a vehicle absent the defendant, could be upheld by falling within this “well delineated exception[].”42
In Belton, the Supreme Court assessed the lawfulness of police actions, beginning with a routine traffic stop of the defendant for

35

395 U.S. 752 (1969), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (noting that the rule set forth by the Court in Chimel was later qualified and clarified by the
Court in Belton, and then again, by the Court in Gant, and the abrogation of the Court’s ruling in Chimel occurred because the search had occurred years prior to, and the appeal was
merely pending, when the decision in Gant was made). In Davis, the Court held that
“[e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent
is not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429.
36
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
37
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.
38
Id. at 765 (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
39
Id. at 768
40
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2424 (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 458-59) (alterations in original).
41
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
42
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
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speeding.43 At the time of the stop, the officer observed an envelope
in the vehicle with language written on it referencing marijuana.44
The lower court found this observation coupled with the smell of marijuana enough to give the officer probable cause to arrest the occupants of the car.45 However, the lower court concluded, searching the
car’s backseat and seizing cocaine from the car was unreasonable.46
Reversing the lower court’s ruling on appeal,47 the Supreme Court established that when a police officer makes a lawful arrest of “the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of
that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.”48
Nevertheless, the proper application of the aforementioned
exception remained disputed, as some “courts read the decision to authorize automobile searches incident to arrests of recent occupants,
regardless of whether the arrestee . . . was in reaching distance of the
vehicle,” while other courts rejected that interpretation of the precedent set forth in Belton.49 Therefore, the court in Tashbaeva referred
to one final Supreme Court decision, Arizona v. Gant,50 explaining
why the search incident to arrest was not applicable under the facts of
the instant case.
In Gant, the police relied on an anonymous tip to investigate
drug sales allegedly occurring in a home.51 The police knocked on
the door of the suspected residence and asked to speak to the owner.52
The defendant, Gant, opened the door and explained to the officers
that he expected the owner to return home later that day.53 After
leaving the residence, an investigative records check revealed that
Gant had been driving with a suspended license.54 Later that evening,
the police returned to the home and arrested two people.55 After se43

Belton, 453 U.S. at 455-56.
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 456.
47
Id.
48
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (footnotes omitted).
49
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2424.
50
556 U.S. 332 (2009) (explaining that the precedent set forth in Belton was to be limited
and that the search incident to arrest doctrine only applies to certain circumstances regarding
the vehicle context).
51
Id. at 335.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 335-36.
54
Id. at 336.
55
Gant, 556 U.S. at 336.
44
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curing the arrestees in different police cars, Gant arrived at the residence and was arrested for driving with a suspended license.56 After
arresting Gant, the police proceeded to search his vehicle, discovering and seizing one gun and one bag of cocaine found inside the
pocket of Gant’s jacket, which was retrieved from the backseat of the
car.57
When the search and seizure was subsequently challenged in
court, the Supreme Court found the search incident to arrest exception inapplicable under these facts.58 The Court explained that because Gant was arrested at his place of residence and not while operating a vehicle, the “police could not reasonably have believed” that
Gant could have accessed the car, or reasonably suspected that evidence of the offense would be found in the car.59 The Supreme Court
concluded that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to
believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”60
Next, the court in Tashbaeva considered how the interval of
time that the car was not in police custody affected the lawfulness of
the search and seizure.61 As there was no New York precedent on
this specific question, the court looked to cases where an initial warrantless search was conducted lawfully, but the search was delayed.62
The court in Tashbaeva summarily dismissed “[t]he concept of an unlimited ongoing crime scene [rule] to the warrant requirement [because it] has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court.”63
Thereafter, the court turned to the concept of a preliminary
investigation,64 looking to an in-depth analysis provided by the Supreme Court, Second Department of the Appellate Division, in People v. Cohen.65 The court in Cohen distinguished the facts before it
56

Id.
Id.
58
Id. at 344.
59
Id. (explaining that the two justifications for a search incident to arrest are safety concerns in protecting the officer when the arrestee is within reaching distance of the compartment, and when an officer reasonably believes there is a likelihood of finding evidence in the
car that is relevant to the offense).
60
Gant, 556 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
61
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 879-80.
65
450 N.Y.S.2d 497 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1982).
57
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from those ruled upon in Mincey v. Arizona66 wherein the United
States Supreme Court rejected the lawfulness of “an exhaustive and
intrusive [warrantless] search” executed over the course of a four-day
period,67 emphasizing the Supreme Court’s reliance on the fact the
search was made “for the purpose of finding and seizing evidence to
support a prosecution.”68 Nevertheless, the court in Cohen was neither persuaded that the death at the premises, nor allegations of murder was sufficient to give the police legal justification for returning to
the unsecured premises and conducting a subsequent warrantless
search.69
In Cohen, the police received a phone call that a shooting occurred at the condominium apartment owned by the Cohen’s.70 Upon
the first responding officer’s arrival at the apartment, the officer encountered the defendant, Patricia Cohen.71 She led the officer into a
bedroom of the apartment where the victim, Doctor Cohen, laid
bleeding from a “gunshot wound to [his] head.”72 The police found
an automatic pistol by Doctor Cohen’s side.73 The defendant claimed
that Doctor Cohen had shot himself while they were sleeping.74
While removing and preparing to transport Doctor Cohen to the hospital, the police seized several items including the gun that was found
next to Doctor Cohen, live ammunition, a shell casing, and two
notes.75 The police left the apartment several hours later without
locking the door.76 Yet, after what seemed a haphazard attempt to
secure the scene, the police did “arrange to have officers on patrol in
the area to keep an eye on the apartment . . . .”77
The following day, the Medical Examiner found evidence to
suggest that the incident might have been a homicide, as opposed to a
suicide.78 Subsequent to receiving this information, the officers re66

437 U.S. 385 (1978).
Id. at 389-90.
68
Cohen, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (quoting People v. Dancey, 443 N.Y.S.2d 776, 778 (1981))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
69
Id. at 501.
70
Id. at 498.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Cohen, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Cohen, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
67
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turned to the apartment and conducted a “top to bottom” search and
seized several more items.79 The police did not obtain a warrant or
even make any effort to do so.80 In turn, the court suppressed the evidence the police retrieved from the apartment.81 In making its ruling, the court first turned to Mincey, agreeing with the court’s rationale:
We do not question the right of the police to respond
to emergency situations. Numerous state and federal
cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment
does not bar police officers from making warrantless
entries and searches when they reasonably believe that
a person within is in need of immediate aid. Similarly,
when the police come upon the scene of a homicide
they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still
on the premises. . . . And the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their
legitimate emergency activities.82
Accordingly, the court in Cohen observed that “when a constitutionally protected area becomes the scene of a crime, the police may subject the premises to a preliminary search and inspection whose scope
and duration must be limited by and reasonably related to the exigencies of the situation.”83 Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court likewise
concluded in Mincey, the court in Cohen found that “[o]nce that preliminary investigation has come to an end . . . no further searches for
evidence may be conducted on the premises unless authorized by a
warrant.”84
The court in Cohen explained that while police are authorized
to conduct a preliminary investigation on the premises of a crime
scene, this initial investigation is “limited by and [must be] reasonably related to the exigencies of the situation.”85 The court further
acknowledged that the lack of an ongoing police presence after the
officers initially left the scene was a significant factor in its determi79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 500 (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392-93) (citations omitted).
Cohen, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
Id.
Id.
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nation because the crime scene was left unattended and not protected
from undue interference.86 Thus, the court in Cohen held that it was
unlawful for the police to have left the crime scene, leaving it unguarded for several hours, and then returning to the scene without a
search warrant and collecting incriminating evidence.87
Accepting the reasoning set forth in Cohen, but seeking further guidance on the impact of and precedent governing an ongoing
crime scene and a preliminary investigation, the court in Tashbaeva
then turned to People v. Neulist88 for guidance.89 In Neulist, the police responded to the scene of an alleged accident and the preliminary
investigation revealed that the victim died as a result of an aneurysm;
however, several hours later, an autopsy revealed a bullet, which led
the police to believe that a homicide occurred.90 While the initial responding officers did not remain present at the crime scene, another
officer safeguarded it.91
Relying heavily on the ongoing police presence at the crime
scene, the court concluded that the subsequent search and seizure was
lawful, and therefore the evidence seized from the scene was admissible against the defendant.92 The court explained, “Although the initial police intrusion was for the purpose of investigating the scene
and the cause of a death, the subsequent search, once criminality had
been established, was but an extension or continuation of the initial
investigation.”93 In arriving at this conclusion, the court rejected “the
line drawn by the County Court in scale or scope between the initial
investigation of the decedent’s death and the subsequent search of the
premises . . . .”94 Instead, the court in Neulist looked to “the broad
and indisputably necessary and proper authority granted to a medical
examiner” whose duty it is to review the evidence and draw conclusions based upon it, and thus, was persuaded that the police acted
within their authority to return to the scene and conduct a subsequent

86
Id. (noting that the officers’ patrol outside of the apartment building did not suffice to
safeguard the crime scene).
87
Id.
88
350 N.Y.S.2d 178 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1973).
89
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
90
Neulist, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 181.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 183.
93
Id. (footnote omitted).
94
Id.
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search.95 While at first glance, the facts in Neulist seem to resemble
those in Cohen, in which the court arrived at the opposite conclusion,
pertinent to the court’s decision was “[t]he posting of a police guard
at the bedroom door [which] served not only to prevent the destruction or removal of any potential evidence but also to establish a continued and legally proper police presence on the scene.”96
In turn, giving weight to the lack of an ongoing police presence at the scene in the instant case, the court in Tashbaeva finally
turned to People v. Dancey,97 distinguishing the facts relied upon in
Dancey from those before it.98 Specifically, although the motion to
suppress pertained to evidence seized in a subsequent warrantless entry and exploration of a crime scene whereby “the investigating detective went to the apartment . . . already occupied by a police
guard,” the court’s ruling in Dancey was less reliant upon the ongoing police presence or the continuum of a preliminary investigation;
instead, the court found the evidence was not seized by a search since
the evidence “was [discovered] in plain view.”99
In Dancey, the defendant told the police that her baby was
locked inside her apartment and was in a plastic bag.100 The police
found the baby in a closet “apparently deceased” and despite
“rush[ing] the baby to the hospital,” the attending doctor was unable
to save its life.101 Thereafter, upon taking the defendant to the local
precinct where she was subjected to routine questioning about the incident, the defendant confessed that she had attempted to kill the
child.102 During the interval of time between when the baby was initially brought to the hospital and the defendant was brought to the
precinct, an officer guarded the crime scene at the apartment.103 At
trial, it was attested that “[a]s a crime scene, the police believed it
was necessary [for an officer to stand guard] to prevent any possible
intrusion into, or disruption of, the apartment which might result in
the loss of relevant evidence.”104
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Neulist, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
Id.
443 N.Y.S.2d 776 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1981).
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
Dancey, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 777-78.
Id. at 777.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Dancey, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
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After the defendant confessed, a detective returned to the
apartment, allegedly “to better view the physical layout of the place
in order to better understand the statements that [had been] given to
him.”105 When the purported search was later challenged at trial, the
investigating detective contended that “[h]is purpose [in returning to
and entering the apartment] was [neither] to search the premises, nor
to gather evidence.”106 Arguably, as such purpose was in part, the
basis in Mincey for the Supreme Court rejecting the constitutionality
of the subsequent search challenged therein, such contention was
made strategically to avoid suppression.107
Nevertheless, while the detective was inside of the apartment,
he observed a note in plain view that contained information incriminating the defendant, and thus, the note was seized.108 Thereafter,
when back at the precinct, the detective asked the defendant if she
wrote the note that he retrieved from the apartment and “[s]he
acknowledged that she had.”109 Thus, upon review, a dual inquiry
was required in order for the court to determine whether the note was
admissible.110 First, the court in Dancey had to determine whether a
search had occurred, and second, if it had, whether the fruits seized
without a warrant were admissible, falling within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant clause.111 At the outset, it is noteworthy that the court considered both Neulist and Mincey, observing that
the police presence justified the search under Neulist and the facts before it differed from those in Mincey because unlike in Mincey the detective was not “there for the purpose of finding and seizing evidence
to support a prosecution.”112 However, it was neither the police presence nor the intent of the investigating detective that justified its rul-

105

Id. at 777-78.
Id. at 777.
107
Compare Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395 (holding that “the warrantless search of [the defendant’s] apartment [for the purpose of gathering evidence to substantiate the crime suspected]
was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide has recently occurred
there”), with Dancey, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 777-78 (noting that the detective alleged and the court
accepted that “[t]he detective was not there to search the premises, nor to gather evidence,”
but that he nevertheless returned to the scene, entered the apartment, and seized evidence
that helped him to understand the defendant’s incriminating statements).
108
Dancey, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
109
Id. at 778.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
106
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ing.113 Rather, the court in Dancey concluded that the detective’s
subsequent “entrance into the apartment constituted no more of an intrusion into defendant’s privacy than did the legitimate presence of
the police guard” at the premises.114 Moreover, the court found that
the note discovered therein was not seized “pursuant to a search” because “[i]t was in plain view.”115 Therefore, construing “the police
presence in the apartment []as a legitimate response to the exigent
need to safeguard the crime scene,” the court in Dancey determined
that “the detective’s appearance [at the scene] and activities [therein]
did not exceed the ambit of that presence, [and thus] the detective had
the right to seize evidence in plain view.”116
IV.

THE HOLDING IN TASHBAEVA

After carefully reviewing each of the relevant doctrines and
the applicable precedent, as set forth above, the court in Tashbaeva
explained:
[While m]indful of the automobile exception, which
often allows the warrantless seizure of an automobile
itself due to its inherent mobility, and that the incriminating evidence in the instant case was observed in
plain view during the preliminary investigation . . . the
officer’s previous plain view observation of the bottles
did not provide the predicate for a warrantless seizure
on the following day.117
In addition, the court took note that “there was no impediment to Officer Tabora’s ability to obtain a warrant since [in fact] he had been
to the District Attorney’s office and met with an Assistant District
Attorney [to discuss the case] before returning to [the crime scene] to
secure the evidence.”118 Therefore, the court concluded that “[o]nce
there is an interruption in their control and custody of a crime scene
the police are required to obtain a warrant in order to retrieve any evidence therefrom[,]” and thus, the seizure of the two bottles was un-

113
114
115
116
117
118

Dancey, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)).
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
Id. at 881-82.
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lawful.119
This holding was consistent with both federal and state precedent, as the court justified its ruling based upon three pertinent observations supported by the case law it explored.120 First, the court considered “the fact that the vehicle remained unsecured by a police
presence during the entire interval between defendant’s arrest and the
seizure . . . .”121 Second, the court recognized “the [unnecessary and
unwarranted] lapse of time between the plain view observations and
the seizure of the bottles . . . .”122 Finally, the court observed that the
seizure was made in “the absence of any exigent circumstances,” as
the prosecution put forth no facts to suggest that the circumstances
surrounding the defendant’s arrest and/or Officer Tabora’s preliminary investigation impeded his ability to seize the evidence observed
in plain view.123 In fact, the notion of immediacy tending to support
a finding of exigent circumstances, such as a threat to the preservation of evidence, was not served by, but rather, put at risk by Officer
Tabora’s “delayed retrieval of evidence.”124 Accordingly, directing
that “a warrantless seizure may not . . . be predicated upon an earlier
plain view observation of the subject evidence[,]” the court in
Tashbaeva upheld the defendant’s right to privacy and security in the
contents of his vehicle, as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.125
This Note will explore the federal and New York State precedent regarding each of the renowned exceptions to the warrant clause,
including exigent circumstances, the plain view doctrine, and the
search incident to a lawful arrest, as well as consider the scope and
duration of a preliminary investigation and ongoing crime scene rule,
which rule has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court, but
nevertheless, relied upon by New York State courts in limited circumstances. While the federal and state approaches are similar, these
doctrines are neither applied nor interpreted precisely the same in
state and federal court. All of these doctrines, when viewed in the
aggregate, assisted the court in Tashbaeva in making its ruling. Thus,
in order to understand the constitutional implications of the subse119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id.
Id. at 881.
Id.
Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 876.
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quent search and seizure that was at issue in Tashbaeva, it is imperative to analyze each of these concepts independently.
V.

FEDERAL PRECEDENT
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-

tects
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants, shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.126
The Fourth Amendment exists for the purpose of protecting the
American citizenry from “unreasonable searches and seizures” conducted by officers acting in their official capacity. 127 As a general
rule, government officials need both probable cause and a warrant in
order to conduct a valid search under the Fourth Amendment.128
Since the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision
in Katz v. United States,129 the Court has endeavored to carefully limit the types and the scope of searches and seizures that will be found
reasonable without a warrant. In Katz, the defendant was suspected
of transferring illegal gambling and wagering information in violation
of a federal statute.130 Thus, in order to confirm or dismiss these suspicions, FBI agents attached an electronic surveillance device to the
outside of a telephone booth in which the defendant used regularly.131
In doing so, the FBI agents were able to listen to and record all of the
conversations of the defendant occurring within the telephone
booth.132 When the defendant challenged the police action, seeking
to suppress the evidence obtained as a result, the Supreme Court observed that the police unconstitutionally obtained information by tap-

126
127
128
129
130
131
132

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
Id.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 348.
Id.
Id.
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ping a public phone booth.133
While the Court explained that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” the Court further emphasized that the place
in which a person occupies does in fact affect the degree and/or expectation of privacy that a person shall possess.134 Moreover, the
Court observed that as a general rule “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.”135 Nevertheless, looking to the facts
in the instant case whereby the defendant was viewable by the public
from within the booth, but purposefully made entry and closed the
door behind him, the Court concluded that “what [an individual]
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.”136 In turn, the precedent set forth
by the Court in Katz set the stage for search and seizure jurisprudence.137
A.

Exigent Circumstances and the Plain View
Doctrine

The Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio138 narrowly interpreted
the Fourth Amendment, providing the police with more leeway in
conducting searches and seizures.139 In doing so, the Court in Terry
did not discount the deep-rooted history of the Fourth Amendment,
but cognizant to the fact that societal changes have an inevitable effect on the enforcement of the law, the Court recognized that circumstances exist in which it impracticable for the police to secure a warrant.140 As a result, the Court established an “exigent circumstances”
exception under which a search and seizure in the absence of probable cause or a warrant may be found lawful. 141 The Court reasoned
133

Id. at 359.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
135
Id.
136
Id. (observing the move from protecting property rights to protecting privacy rights, as
exemplified by the famous quote, “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”).
137
See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 443 (observing the scope and limitations of the plain view
doctrine); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (holding that probable cause is
required to seize an item in plain view); Mincey, 437 U.S. at 385 (holding that a prompt warrantless search can be made for the purpose of protection).
138
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
139
Id. at 30.
140
Id. at 20.
141
Id.
134
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that there are certain times where the immediacy of a situation requires that an officer conduct a search of a person, recognizing that
the immediate safety of the officer in his or her investigation is one
justification.142 However, the Supreme Court attempted to refrain
from creating a broad exception to the warrant clause, explaining that
in order to invoke the exigent circumstances exception, an officer
must have reasonable suspicion before proceeding with the search of
a person when less then probable cause is present, or no warrant has
been obtained.143
The Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire144 explored a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement.145 In Coolidge, the defendant was arrested after an investigation ensued regarding the murder of a young fourteen-year-old girl.146 The police spoke with the
defendant at his home subsequent to the murder, and the defendant,
upon request, produced three guns he owned.147 He also agreed to
submit to a lie detector test regarding his whereabouts on the night of
the murder to be held later that week.148 On the day of the test, two
plain-clothed officers went to the defendant’s home and spoke with
his wife, who eventually produced four guns and clothes that might
have linked the defendant to the murder.149 After obtaining this evidence, the police continued their investigation until a hearing between the police and the State Attorney General was held in order for
the police to get an arrest and search warrant.150 Upon arrest later
that day, pursuant to a search warrant for the vehicles, the police impounded the vehicles and on several occasions performed a sweep of
them for evidence.151 The Court agreed that the warrant was invalid,
and therefore, observed that the search and seizure of the vehicles
would not be upheld unless an exception was found to be applicable.152
The Government argued several exceptions applied, including
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 27.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Id.
Id. at 445-46.
Id.
Id. at 446.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 446.
Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 449, 453.
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the search incident to arrest exception and the plain view doctrine.153
The law has long recognized “that under certain circumstances the
police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.”154 Thus,
the State proposed that because the car seized was in plain view, both
the warrantless seizure and subsequent search at the police station did
not undermine the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.155
However, the Supreme Court explained that two requirements must
be met for a plain view observation to be reasonable.156 First, the
Court expressed “that plain view alone is never enough to justify the
warrantless seizure of evidence.”157 Second, the Court reiterated the
inadvertence requirement, meaning that the item seized cannot be the
focus of the search, or anticipated before the search commences.158
Hence, the Court explained that the police may only rely upon the
plain view exception when the items were observed incidentally as a
result of a justified search.159 The Court directed that this exception
is not intended to justify a search on its own with nothing more, and
“no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent ‘exigent circumstances.’ ”160 Therefore, the seizure of the
car in this particular case was unlawful because the officers could
have and should have obtained a valid warrant.161
In Horton v. California,162 the Court looked at the second limitation set forth in Coolidge, one of inadvertence, determining that
this limitation to a plain view observation was not necessary to make
a lawful seizure of an item, so long as the other conditions are satisfied.163 In Horton, an officer acted upon probable cause to search the
defendant’s home for the proceeds of a robbery and any weapons that
might have been used during the crime.164 The search warrant that
was granted did not enumerate any weapons, but did specifically au-

153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id. at 453-55, 464.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 468.
Id.
Id. at 469-70.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469-70.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 472-73.
496 U.S. 128 (1990).
Id. at 130.
Id. at 130-31.
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thorize police to search for the proceeds from the robbery. 165 During
the search, the police found several guns in plain view and seized
them.166 The defendant argued that the discovery of the weapons was
not inadvertent because although the search warrant failed to enumerate weapons, a supporting affidavit from the police officer mentioned them.167 In turn, the Court concluded inadvertence is not a
necessary condition to a plain view observation and subsequent seizure.168
The Court in Horton also refined the precedent of the plain
view doctrine.169 In addition to the limitation set forth by Coolidge
“that plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence[,]”170 the Court in Horton set forth three conditions
that must be met in order to invoke the doctrine.171 First, the officer
must have lawfully arrived at the place where the evidence was plainly viewed.172 Second, it is not enough that the item is in plain view,
but “its incriminating character must also be ‘immediately apparent.’ ”173 Third, the officer must “have a lawful right of access to the
object itself.”174
In Arizona v. Hicks,175 a man was injured in his apartment
when a bullet was fired through the floor and hit him.176 The police
entered the respondent’s apartment where they found and seized three
weapons.177 While in the apartment, Officer Nelson observed stereo
components that seemed expensive and looked displaced.178 He suspected that it may have been stolen, so he moved the items to view
the serial numbers, and then proceeded to write the information
down.179 After tracing the serial numbers, the police discovered they

165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

Id. at 131.
Id.
Horton, 496 U.S. at 131.
Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 136.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468.
Horton, 496 U.S. at 136.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326-27).
Id. at 137.
480 U.S. 321 (1987).
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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were linked to an armed robbery.180 The Supreme Court in Hicks further clarified the scope of the plain view doctrine, explaining “probable cause is required” to seize an item.181 The court explained that
although seizing an item requires probable cause, “the search of objects in plain view that occurred here could be sustained on lesser
grounds.”182 The State conceded that Officer Nelson only had reasonable suspicion, even though the court said that moving the components would have been a valid plain view observation under these
circumstances.183 Although the search could have been found proper
on lesser grounds, the seizure nonetheless required probable cause.184
Due to the State’s concession that the officer only had reasonable
suspicion, the Court ruled that the seizure was unlawful.185 The
Court decided this because it wanted to maintain that police officers
can seize objects in plain view, but at the same time, it wanted to afford protections against arbitrary seizures. The Court therefore required probable cause to seize the item in plain view, a higher standard than the reasonable suspicion the officer conceded.
B.

The Search Incident to Arrest Exception

In addition to the plain view exception, another controversial
and complex area is the search incident to an arrest exception.186 The
seminal case in this area is Chimel v. California.187 In Chimel, police
officers arrived at the defendant’s home with a valid arrest warrant
due to their belief that he was connected to a recent burglary of a coin
shop.188 The defendant’s wife gave the police permission to enter
their home.189 However, the defendant was not home at the time.190
The police waited approximately ten to fifteen minutes for the de-

180

Hicks, 480 U.S. at 3263.
Id. at 326.
182
Id. at 327-28 (observing that unlike a seizure which now requires probable cause, the
search leading up the a potential seizure could be upheld in the future on lesser grounds then
probable cause).
183
Id. at 326.
184
Id. at 327-28.
185
Hicks, 480 U.S. at 327-28.
186
WARD, supra note 3.
187
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 752.
188
Id. at 753.
189
Id.
190
Id.
181
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fendant to return, at which time they made the arrest. 191 The police
then requested permission to search and the defendant expressly refused.192 The police, without a search warrant, searched the home regardless of the lack of consent, and seized several incriminating
items.193 The Court identified two significant instances that might
justify a search incident to arrest.194 First, a warrantless search may
be upheld if necessary for the protection of the police officer or others nearby.195 Moreover, the search might be found lawful if necessary to safeguard evidence that could be destroyed.196 The Court held
that “[t]here is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—
construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”197
The Court expanded and clarified the precedent set forth in
Chimel in Belton, addressing the issue of how a search incident to arrest applies in the automobile context.198 In Belton, a state trooper
pulled over a vehicle that contained four people.199 The trooper determined that neither the passengers nor the driver owned the car or
were even related to the owner of the car.200 The trooper sensed the
smell of marijuana and saw an item in the car that was commonly
linked to drugs.201 He removed the occupants from the car, placed
each under arrest, and patted them down.202 The trooper then split
them apart far enough so that they physically could not reach the other.203 Thereafter, the trooper entered the vehicle in order to search the
passenger compartment and open the pocket of a jacket on the back
seat, at which time the trooper discovered cocaine.204 When the
search and seizure was challenged as unconstitutional at trial, the
Court observed that as an incident to an arrest, an officer may search
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

Id.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753-54.
Id.
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 454.
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 455-56.
Id. at 456.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 456.
Id.
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the passenger compartment of a vehicle and all of the containers in
the vehicle, even if the arrestee could not gain access to the vehicle
during the time of the search.205 The Court concluded, consistent
with the precedent in Chimel, that the jacket was within the immediate control of the arrestee, and therefore, the search and seizure was
lawful and reasonable under the circumstances.206
However, as a result of the varying applications of the rule as
set forth by the Court in Belton, the Supreme Court in Gant granted
certiorari, and in turn, limited the scope of the search incident to arrest exception.207 In Gant, the defendant was arrested for driving
with a suspended licensed.208 After being handcuffed and locked in a
patrol car, the police searched the defendant’s car and found cocaine
in the pocket of a jacket.209 The Court held that “[p]olice may search
a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence
of the offense of arrest.”210 The Court further explained that this rule
exists for police safety and the preservation of evidence, without
which the “search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless
police obtain a warrant or . . . another exception to the warrant requirement applies.”211
C.

Preliminary Investigation Concept

In Flippo v. West Virginia,212 the Court addressed an issue
with regard to preliminary investigation. In Flippo, the petitioner
called the police, informing them that he and his wife were attacked.213 When the police arrived, they found the petitioner severely
injured.214 The petitioner’s wife was discovered dead with head
wounds.215 Without a warrant, for the following sixteen hours, the
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id. at 457.
Id. at 462-63.
Gant, 556 U.S. at 347.
Id. at 335.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Id.
528 U.S. 11, 14 (1999).
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/9

22

McGowan: A Delayed Search of an Automobile

2013]

A DELAYED SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE

1105

police searched for, photographed, and seized evidence in the cabin
in which the body was found.216 Thereafter, the petitioner sought to
suppress the evidence retrieved from the cabin, “argu[ing] that the
police had obtained no warrant, and that no exception to the warrant
requirement justified the search and seizure.”217 The Court rejected
to observe the purported “ ‘crime scene exception’ to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”218 The Court further explained that the police could not justify a warrantless search of the
cabin based solely on the fact that a crime occurred in that area.219
The Court held that the “police may make warrantless entries onto
premises if they reasonably believe a person is in need of immediate
aid and may make prompt warrantless searches of a homicide scene
for possible other victims or a killer on the premises.”220
In Mincey, a narcotics raid resulted in the death of an officer
at the defendant’s home.221 The narcotics agents raided the house,
secured the scene, and performed a brief search in an effort to look
for other individuals.222 Thereafter, homicide agents arrived and
commenced a four-day long search.223 The Court explained that officers may only “make a prompt warrantless search of the area” for
their protection and the protection of possible victims or civilians in
that house.224 The Court further recognized that a four-day warrantless search of the home was entirely unreasonable.225 The Court noted that the search conducted was not prompt and overly exhaustive.226 Thus, the evidence seized from the scene was suppressed.227
VI.

NEW YORK STATE PRECEDENT

“[A]lthough the history and identical language of the State
and Federal constitutional privacy guarantees . . . generally support a
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

Id.
Flippo, 528 U.S. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 387.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 388-89.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 393.
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 389.
Id. 389-90.
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‘policy of uniformity,’ [the New York Court of Appeals] has demonstrated its willingness to adopt more protective standards under the
State Constitution.”228 As the New York Court of Appeals has observed, “It is fundamental that warrantless searches and seizures are
per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the acknowledged
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.”229
A.

The Plain View Doctrine

New York State Courts have recognized several exceptions to
the warrant requirement. One of the most controversial, complex,
and comprehensive exceptions is the plain view doctrine. In order to
invoke the plain view doctrine as an exception justifying a warrantless seizure, three requirements must be met: “(1) the police [must
be] lawfully in the position from which the object is viewed; (2) the
police [must] have lawful access to the object; and (3) the object’s incriminating nature [must be] immediately apparent.”230
In People v. Spinelli,231 two trucks were reported as hi232
The trucks were later found in the rear of the defendant’s
jacked.
place of business through a confidential informant.233 An officer
from a public spot observed the two trucks and determined that they
were the stolen vehicles.234 The police then arrested the defendant on
unrelated charges.235 After the arrest, they verified the vehicles were
stolen, proceeded to the back of the business without a search warrant, and searched the cars for information.236 The court in Spinelli
adopted the following rule from the United States Supreme Court decision in Coolidge.237 The court reiterated two caveats to the plain
view doctrine including: (1) a plain view observation is never suffi228

People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61, 63 (N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted).
People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 300 (N.Y. 1993), abrogated by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (relying on the same reasoning set forth by the Court in Katz, 389
U.S. 347).
230
Id. at 301 (citations omitted).
231
315 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1974).
232
Id. at 793.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Spinelli, 315 N.E.2d at 793.
237
Id. at 794 (stating that when a law enforcement official observes an item in plain view,
it does not follow that the officer can conduct a warrantless search and seizure without any
restrictions).
229
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cient by itself to “justify a warrantless search and seizure,” and (2) a
plain view observation must be inadvertent, and in no way anticipated.238 The court further held that “it makes no difference if the article
seized is ‘mere evidence,’ contraband or evidence of the crime or
fruits of the crime.”239
In People v. Wasserman,240 the defendant was charged with
the murder of his wife.241 He reported her missing to the police and
her body was ultimately found behind the defendant’s place of business.242 During a lawful search of his apartment, a detective who
specialized in serology and blood-related evidence found five pieces
of evidence allegedly in plain view, seizing them for further inspection.243 The court found that four of the five seized items were admissible, and that the fifth was inadmissible because it was not in
plain view.244 The court in Wasserman, as a result, did away with the
inadvertence condition, which meant that the object seized could not
have been the item being specifically searched for.245 The court observed that “the element of inadvertence, required when Spinelli was
decided, is no longer necessary in New York to seize evidence pursuant to the plain view exception.”246
In People v. Brown,247 the defendant allegedly stole a trac248
tor. He requested the help of a friend in switching the vehicle identification numbers with another tractor, but that friend refused to participate.249 The friend reported the defendant’s plan to the police, and
the police ultimately obtained a search warrant for “the stolen tractor’s ignition key, the missing VIN plate, [a] steel chain, the top link
bar” and anything else that may be considered contraband.250 While
searching for the items, the police discovered several guns.251 The
238

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
240
668 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
241
Id. at 315.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 317.
244
Id. at 318.
245
Wasserman, 668 N.Y.S.2d at 317 (explaining that the condition of inadvertence is unnecessary and impractical).
246
Id. at 317.
247
749 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 2001).
248
Id. at 172.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 173.
251
Id.
239
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court explained that the legal presence of the police to physically
view and seize the evidence in question was critical to its determination of whether the search could be upheld under the plain view doctrine.252
The court further emphasized that the warrant is what defines
“the permissible scope and intensity of the search.”253 There are two
conditions that the court sets out that must be satisfied for this kind of
seizure to be lawful.254 These conditions include: “(i) f[inding] the
item in a place where one reasonably would have expected to look
while searching for an object particularly described and (ii) f[inding]
it before they found all the objects described in the valid portion of
the warrant.”255 In turn, the court determined that the seizure of the
guns was lawful because the police sufficiently proved the two conditions required in meeting their burden of introducing this kind of
plain view evidence.256
In People v. Batista,257 the plain view doctrine was again explored and further clarified.258 In Batista, the police got a search warrant for an apartment, which they suspected was being utilized for the
possession, packaging, and selling of cocaine and crack-cocaine.259
During the search, the doorbell for the apartment rang.260 The police
permitted the person to enter into the apartment, but did not notify
him of their presence.261 When the person entered into the apartment,
the police sprung out and ordered him to put his hands up.262 As a result of his arms being raised, a brown paper bag fell to the floor.263
The officer immediately concluded it contained narcotics. 264 The officer then opened the bag and discovered cocaine.265
When the seizure of the drugs obtained in the course of the
search was challenged, the court reviewed the facts surrounding the
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265

Brown, 749 N.E.2d at 177.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 178.
690 N.Y.S.2d 536 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999).
Id. at 538.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id.
Batista, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 537.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 538.
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search and seizure by analyzing the three conditions to the plain view
exception.266 In turn, the court concluded that the first two requirements were satisfied; however, the third condition begged for a more
scrutinized analysis.267 To determine whether the incriminating nature of the package was immediately apparent, the court established a
standard setting forth that probable cause is required in associating
the property with criminal activity.268 Probable cause existed because
the police were in an area lawfully sanctioned by a warrant, and
while in that area, were conducting a search for drugs. 269 Therefore,
the search and seizure of the bag was reasonable because probable
cause existed.270
In People v. Johnson,271 while lawfully investigating a radio
report regarding an assault, an arresting officer noticed, in plain view,
the handle of a gun in the back of the defendant’s double-parked
car.272 The court first acknowledged that the invocation of the plain
view exception was not precluded, merely because the officer admitted that he was initially unsure of what the black object was.273 The
court reiterated that near certainty is not required to invoke the plain
view doctrine, but rather if the circumstances of the case would lead a
person of reasonable caution to believe that the item may be contraband.274 As part of the officer’s testimony, he stated that the defendant spoke of “want[ing] . . . vengeance” on certain people.275 In turn,
this observation was sufficient to find that the officer acted with
probable cause to seize the weapon, even though he was not entirely
sure of what the object truly was.276 There was also sufficient evidence provided that a “factfinder could infer that [the] defendant exercised dominion and control over the gun that was found behind the
driver’s seat of his nearby car.”277 Therefore, the court properly de-
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267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277

Id.
Batista, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
Id.
Id.
Id.
802 N.Y.S.2d 830 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005).
Id. at 831.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
Id. (citations omitted).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 [2013], Art. 9

1110

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

nied the defendant’s motion to suppress.278
In People v. Ballard,279 the defendant was charged and convicted with the criminal sale of a controlled substance.280 The court
resolved the first issue of when handcuffs were placed on the defendant.281 In reviewing the record, the court found it sufficient to support
a finding that the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant.282
After the arrest was made, an officer with narcotics experience made
a plain view observation of a bag that resembled cocaine. 283 The
court held that the plain view doctrine justified the seizure of the bag,
and that the motion to suppress the evidence was properly denied.284
In People v. McEniry,285 the defendant appealed a conviction
including the possession of a controlled substance and the operation
of a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs. 286 The defendant’s
van had collided with a police car that was extended into the street.287
After the collision, the police officer entered the van lawfully, thereafter making a plain view observation of drugs.288 The police officer
then seized the drugs.289 The court determined that “[s]ince the officer was lawfully present in the van and inadvertently saw the drugs,
[the drugs] were properly admitted under the plain view doctrine.”290
In People v. Dobson,291 the defendant, a passenger in a car
that the police pulled over, was observed to be putting something
down his pants.292 In turn, the officer patted down the defendant for
weapons in order to ensure his safety.293 One officer noticed a plastic
bag sticking out of the back of the defendant’s pants.294 Through her
experience and training, she was able to conclude that there were
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294

Id.
869 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 413-14.
Id. at 414.
Ballard, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
659 N.Y.S.2d 487 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997).
Id. at 487.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McEniry, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
838 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2007).
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.
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drugs in the bag.295 She pulled out the bag from the defendant’s
pants, determining afterwards that it contained crack cocaine.296 The
defendant argued, and the court agreed, that the plain view doctrine
was not applicable under the facts of this case.297 The court explained that “[t]he plain view doctrine . . . establishes an exception to
the requirement of a warrant not to search for an item, but to seize
it.”298 The contents of the bag were only revealed after the officer
pulled it out of the defendant’s pants.299 The court further noted two
circumstances, which would have otherwise justified the invocation
of the plain view doctrine.300 First, the court stated, “[T]he plastic
bag, by its very nature, could not support any reasonable expectation
of privacy because its content [being illegal contraband] could be inferred from its outward appearance.”301 Second, the court stated,
“[I]f the distinctive configuration of the bag proclaimed its contents[,]” such a circumstance would likewise justify the court to apply
the plain view doctrine.302 Neither of these two circumstances was
found in this case, therefore the lower court ruling to suppress the evidence was affirmed.303
B.

The Ongoing Crime Scene Rule and Preliminary
Investigation Concept

The courts have also discussed and analyzed other exceptions
to the warrant requirement, and although recognized in limited circumstances notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court rejection of the doctrine, the ongoing crime scene rule remains valid in
New York state courts to justify a warrantless search. The concept of
preliminary investigation is in a symbiotic union with the ongoing
crime scene rule and the two are often inseparable.
In People v. Cohen,304 Doctor Cohen was found in his con-
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Id.
Dobson, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
Id.
Id. (quoting Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 301) (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Dobson, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
Id.
Id. at 129-30.
450 N.Y.S.2d 497 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1982).
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dominium with gunshot wounds.305 The defendant told the police
that Doctor Cohen had shot himself, but after investigating the crime
scene and processing its findings, the medical examiner’s office told
the police that a homicide was the more likely result of Doctor Cohen’s death.306 After the last police officer left the scene at 3:00 a.m.,
the crime scene remained unoccupied by the police.307 Once the police were notified of a possible homicide, they conducted a warrantless search of the condominium and found incriminating evidence.308
The police did not obtain a warrant or even make an effort to do so.309
The court subsequently suppressed the evidence, holding that the police can conduct a preliminary investigation on the premises that is
the crime scene, but this initial investigation is “limited by and reasonably related to the exigencies of the situation.”310
In Neulist, David Lucas reported that he had found his mother
dead in her bedroom.311 The police arrived at the crime scene and
began their preliminary investigation.312 Based on the circumstances
and evidence present, the police were led to believe that the mother
died of natural causes, specifically, an aneurysm.313 Several hours
later, an autopsy revealed a bullet in the mother’s head, and the same
officers returned to the scene to conduct a search.314 When the initial
responding officers were away from the crime scene, one police officer guarded the crime scene while other officer’s secured the bedroom in which the body was found.315 Upon returning to the scene,
the officers who were a part of the preliminary investigation completed their search and found incriminating evidence.316 The court found
the search and seizure lawful based on the fact that there had been a
police officer guarding the scene, “thereby establishing a continuing
police presence on the scene.”317
305

Id. at 498.
Id.
307
Id. (noting that although there were officers outside the apartment on patrol, such presence was insufficient to safeguard the crime scene).
308
Id.
309
Cohen, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
310
Id. at 501.
311
Neulist, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 180.
312
Id.
313
Id. at 181.
314
Id.
315
Id.
316
Neulist, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 181.
317
Id. at 184-85.
306
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In Dancey, the defendant reported to the police that she had
been locked out of her apartment and that her baby was locked inside.318 She claimed that the defendant’s husband put the baby into a
plastic bag.319 After the police broke into the apartment, they found
the baby.320 The baby was taken to the hospital, but was pronounced
dead soon thereafter.321 While the defendant was in the precinct, she
admitted to putting the baby in the plastic bag. 322 During the interval
of time between when the baby was brought to the hospital and the
defendant was at the precinct, an officer guarded the crime scene at
the apartment.323 As this officer guarded the scene, a detective entered the apartment to get a better view of the crime scene.324 However, in plain view, the detective saw incriminating evidence, and
seized it.325 This seizure was upheld in court because of the ongoing
police presence, the lawful presence of the detective at the crime scene, and the incriminating items being found in plain view.326
VII.

CONCLUSION

The court in Tashbaeva addressed a question of first impression—whether subsequent to a plain view observation, an officer may
leave the scene of a crime and return at a later time to seize the evidence previously observed. Notwithstanding some minor differences
in the manner in which the exceptions to the warrant clause discussed
herein are interpreted and applied, the protections afforded in the
context of search and seizure jurisprudence at both the state and federal level are consistent. However, as the states maintain an inherent
police power to create new law and enforce historical guarantees such
as the protection individuals maintain against unreasonable searches
and seizures to the degree necessary to safeguard its citizenry, the
trend among New York State courts is to afford more privacy rights
than those recognized among the federal courts. Yet all courts, at
both the state and federal level, adhere to the view that warrantless
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326

Dancey, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Dancey, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
Id. at 777-78.
Id. at 778.
Id.
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searches, as that conducted in Tashbaeva, are per se unreasonable.
Therefore, unless the prosecution presents a case so as to justify invocation of an exception to the warrant clause, courts will suppress
the fruits of an unlawful search in order to uphold those guarantees
that the Fourth Amendment mandates.
The court in Tashbaeva did as any court must in reviewing an
issue of first impression, considering any and all plausibly relevant
doctrines in light of the distinct set of facts before it. While the facts
in the case law explored herein may only differ slightly, including,
inter alia, by the scope and duration of the search conducted and/or
by the interim of time that passed from the preliminary investigation
until the subsequent search and seizure, the divergent holdings in
each case demonstrate that close scrutiny of these variables is imperative to limit the authority of law enforcement and preserve the right to
privacy that the framers of the constitution so intended.
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